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CRA Dossier

Dormant and stubbed code as a risk assessment instrument against substantial modification

How later feature activation can avoid a new EU declaration of conformity

by Daniel Thompson-Yvetot for CrabNebula Ltd.

Can you ship next year’s feature today, so that switching it on later isn’t a CRA substantial modification? Under the Cyber Resilience Act, a substantial modification to a product that is subsequently made available in the market can require the modified version to be treated as a new placing on the market, with a new conformity assessment and a new or updated EU declaration of conformity, as appropriate. Article 3(30) measures every change against the product as it was assessed. The Commission’s guidance of 27 July 2026 confirms that functionality described, assessed and mitigated before release can be activated later without starting again, provided that the activation remains within the original intended purpose, assessed cybersecurity-risk profile and implemented safeguards. The guidance gives the example of control features shipped disabled, whose activation the risk assessment already covered by the manufacturer’s CRA cybersecurity risk assessment. This dossier explains how dormant and stubbed code can support the evidence for that purpose, and where the approach fails. It separates four code states (dead code, stubs, dormant features and planned-only features), each with a different attack surface and a different value as evidence. It sets out the assessed feature envelope (the assessed envelope) that every subsequent release is checked against, and a five-point CRA substantial-modification test to run at activation.

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Written for CTOs, heads of engineering, product managers and compliance leads planning features beyond the first release of software or a connected product.

Why it matters

The protection comes entirely from the original cybersecurity risk assessment and supporting technical documentation, not from the code. Shipping the code is neither necessary nor sufficient. The guidance clearly delineates that even a small feature can constitute a CRA substantial modification if its risks were never assessed, such as persistent login or an unencrypted diagnostics export. The size of the change does not matter.

Dormant code is attack surface from the first day on the market. It must be considered in the CRA risk assessment and the product must be placed on the market without exploitable vulnerabilities. Its components must also be addressed through the manufacturer’s vulnerability handling process and included in the Software Bill of Materials to the extent required by the documented SBOM scope. The gate is decisive. A feature that a writable setting or an unauthenticated flag can switch on is reachable in practice. One that only the manufacturer’s signed update can enable is far harder to reach. A list of possible future features with no interfaces, data flows or controls doesn’t meet the guidance’s condition. A market surveillance authority must be able to compare the later release with the intended purpose, risks, controls and assumptions recorded in the original technical documentation.

What is inside

  • The legal test. How the CRA defines a substantial modification and how the Commission’s guidance applies it, with examples from both sides of the line and four questions to ask of any software update.
  • Four code states. Dead code, stubs, dormant features and planned-only features, compared for their attack surface at placing on the market and their value as evidence of anticipation.
  • An order of preference. Planned-only features with stubs first, then compile-time exclusion, then runtime gating only where a field constraint justifies it, with activation only through the manufacturer’s authenticated channel.
  • The assessed envelope. Seven dimensions per planned feature, each mapped to the consideration in the Commission guidance it answers. The dossier identifies the evidence that the CRA technical documentation should hold for each code state, and the five-point check at activation.
  • Edge cases. Updated versus new declarations of conformity, licence unlocks that create separate variants, notified body scope, and the three cases where the approach fails.
  • Practical follow-up. Twelve operational steps, six monitoring triggers and an annex of the operative texts.

Who is it for

CTOs, heads of engineering, product managers, software architects, product security teams and compliance leads planning features beyond the first release of software or a connected product.

Written by Daniel Thompson-Yvetot for Comply.Land / CrabNebula Ltd. Desk assessment of the CRA and Commission guidance C(2026) 5252 final. prEN 40000-1-4 is relied on for its approach only. Not legal advice, not a conformity determination.

Basis. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (CRA), Art. 3(23), 3(30), 3(41), 13(2), 13(3), 13(7), 28(2) and 69(2), Annex I, Part I, points (2)(a) and (2)(j), recitals 39 and 41; Commission guidance C(2026) 5252 final; prEN 40000-1-4 (enquiry draft, approach only)

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